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SENSITIVE  
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LONDON FOR POL - LORD  
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SUBJECT: GOC "INTRA-CHADIAN DIPLOMACY" SCORING CONTINUED  
SUCCESS IN OUTREACH TO CHAD REBELS AND OPPONENTS

REF: A. NDJAMENA 438

[1](#)B. NDJAMENA 429

[1](#)C. NDJAMENA 406

[1](#)D. NDJAMENA 401

[1](#)E. NDJAMENA 355

[1](#)F. NDJAMENA 214

[1](#)G. NDJAMENA 102

[1](#)H. 08 NDJAMENA 571

[1](#)I. 08 NDJAMENA 494

[1](#)J. 08 NDJAMENA 396

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SUMMARY  
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[1](#)1. The Deby Government's outreach to Chad rebels and former regime opponents, which we have long characterized as "intra-Chadian diplomacy," to distinguish it from classic, "Westphalian" intra-state diplomacy, has played a major role in ensuring Chad's national security by dividing and weakening the rebellion aimed at overthrowing the current government by force of arms. A tour d'horizon given by Chad's National Mediator to the Ambassador October 19 highlights the accomplishments of the GOC's long and patient effort to woo rebels and other opponents, resulting in their return to Chad to participate in the broader process of national reconciliation in which the Deby regime is engaged.

[1](#)2. "Intra-Chadian diplomacy" has its own rules and protocols, rooted in Chad's distinct, indigenous political culture, whose dynamics are different from classic Western-style diplomacy. It is highly personal, exploits family, clan and ethnic ties, and provides incentives in the form of position for rebel elites and financial benefits for the rank and file. "Intra-Chadian diplomacy" is patient and persistent in its pursuit of incremental results. The recent return of prominent rebel leader Ahmat Soubiane and former President Goukouni Oueddei to Chad, along with significant numbers of their followers, are just the latest victories in the GOC's intra-Chadian diplomatic effort: Recall that the current Prime Minister is a former regime opponent and that the decisive GOC victory over the last rebel invasion was led by former rebel warlord Hassan Al-Djinedi.

¶3. (SBU) The notion that "intra-Chadian diplomacy" as practiced by the National Mediator and others in the Deby regime is not a valid method for reaching out to rebels and opponents ignores the dynamics of Chadian political culture and the realities of the GOC's success in reducing the virulence of the Chad rebellion over the past 18 months. A review of reftels will reveal the nature, workings, and consistent incremental successes of "intra-Chadian diplomacy" since the events of February 2008 concentrated the Deby regime's mind on how to end the existential threat presented by the Chadian rebellion. END SUMMARY.

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THE NATIONAL MEDIATOR  
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¶4. (SBU) Ambassador met October 19 with Chad's National Mediator, Abderamane Moussa, who gave him a tour d'horizon of his activities that underlined the consistent success of the GOC's ongoing efforts toward national reconciliation through outreach to Chad rebel groups and leaders and former regime opponents, as well as prospects for an improved Chad-Sudan relationship.

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TWO RECENT KEY PRIZES:  
SOUBIANE AND GOUKOUNI  
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¶5. (SBU) Moussa claimed that President Deby's "extended hand" policy continued to successfully attract rebel groups and leaders, as well as former non-violent regime opponents, back to Chad.

-- The legal basis for rebel return to Chad was the 2007 Sirte Accord, which continued to function well and was clear

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and fair to all sides.

-- The two biggest recent prizes, Moussa said, were Ahmat Hassaballah Soubiane and Goukouni Oueddei.

¶6. (SBU) Former rebel leader Ahmat Hassaballah Soubiane, who had just returned "definitively" from Sudan and Libya on October 17, was intent on helping Deby improve the general political environment, including the GOC's relationship with Chadian rebels and the Khartoum Government.

-- Moussa said that Soubiane's troops were already at the GOC's reception center and that Soubiane and his staff were seeking accommodations in town. (NOTE: The semi-official daily Le Progres headlined October 19 that "Soubiane Returns Definitively," and that 1600 of his troops were in Moussoro. END NOTE.)

-- At the Ambassador's request, Moussa said that he would arrange for him to meet with Soubiane shortly.

¶7. (SBU) Former President Goukouni Oueddei planned to settle in Chad permanently, as soon as the GOC could provide him with an official residence appropriate to a former chief of state, which the GOC was happy to do.

-- Moussa said that Goukouni's commitment to national reconciliation would be a powerful tool to accomplish that end, especially in his home region of the far-north Tibesti, where his Toubou fellow-tribesmen, who suffered from perceived neglect by the GOC and had problems, like landmines, resulting from the Chad-Libyan wars of the 1980s, were liable to be attracted to dissident movements.

-- Moussa asked for USG development assistance to focus on the Tibesti, claiming that the region was falling victim to illegal trafficking, including a Nigeria-to-Egypt drug trafficking route, that the GOC was still powerless to stop.

-- At the Ambassador's request, Moussa said that he would arrange for him to meet with Goukouni as soon as possible after his return to Chad.

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NOURI AND ERDIMI:  
PERSONAE NON GRATAE  
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¶8. (SBU) Moussa underscored that rebel leaders Timan Erdimi and Mahamat Nouri remained personae non gratae in Chad.

-- He said the two leaders were "traitors to President Deby and to Chad" and that the two would have to find another country in which to live, because they could never be sure of their security in a country they had betrayed.

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CHAD-SUDAN DETENTE?  
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¶9. (SBU) Moussa, who was twice Chadian Ambassador to Sudan, said that he was encouraged by Sudanese Presidential counselor Ghazi Sallah Eddin's recent visit to Chad and the talks the latter had with the GOC and with UN/AU Special Mediator Bassole here.

-- Moussa said that he understood that Ghazi had talked about a "congress" that rebel leaders remaining in Sudan would be organizing soon, perhaps at the behest of the Khartoum Government.

-- Moussa said that the GOC hoped that this "rebel congress" would result in the remaining rebels deciding either to make peace and return to Chad; or stay in Sudan as refugees; or to give up armed struggle and "retire" to third countries, such as Mahamat Nouri to Saudi Arabia and Timan Erdimi to join his brother Tom in Texas. (NOTE: We discouraged the latter course of action. END NOTE.)

-- Moussa said that the best way for the Chad-Sudan "proxy war" to end would be by putting a joint GOC-GOS force to

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control the border, after which Chad could permit international and Sudanese monitors the opportunity to verify that there were no "JEM military bases" in Chad.

-- Moussa said that the GOC was continuing to press JEM to participate in efforts for a negotiated peace in Darfur and that President Deby was always ready to assist bringing the different Darfur sides together, in so far as he was able to do and in so far as the Khartoum Government permitted him to act.

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COMMENT  
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¶10. (SBU) The Deby Government's outreach to Chad rebels and former regime opponents, which we have long characterized as "intra-Chadian diplomacy," to distinguish it from classic, "Westphalian" intra-state diplomacy, has played a major role in ensuring Chad's national security by dividing and weakening the rebellion aimed at overthrowing the current government by force of arms. This tour d'horizon by the National Mediator highlights the accomplishments of the GOC's long and patient effort to woo rebels and other opponents, resulting in their return to Chad to participate in the broader process of national reconciliation in which the Deby regime is engaged.

¶11. (SBU) "Intra-Chadian diplomacy" has its own rules and protocols, rooted in Chad's distinct, indigenous political culture, whose dynamics are different from classic

Western-style diplomacy. It is highly personal, exploits family, clan and ethnic ties, and provides incentives in the form of position for rebel elites and financial benefits for the rank and file. "Intra-Chadian diplomacy" is patient and persistent in its pursuit of incremental results. The recent return of prominent rebel leader Ahmat Soubiane and former President Goukouni Oueddei to Chad, along with significant numbers of their followers, are just the latest victories in the GOC's intra-Chadian diplomatic effort: Recall that the current Prime Minister is a former regime opponent and that the decisive GOC victory over the last rebel invasion was led by former rebel warlord Hassan Al-Djinedi.

¶12. (SBU) The notion that intra-Chadian diplomacy as practiced by the National Mediator and others in the Deby regime is not a valid method for reaching out to rebels and opponents ignores the dynamics of Chadian political culture and the realities of the GOC's success in reducing the virulence of the Chad rebellion over the past 18 months. A review of reftels will reveal the nature, workings, and consistent incremental successes of "intra-Chadian diplomacy" since the events of February 2008 concentrated the Deby regime's mind on how to end the existential threat presented by the Chadian rebellion. END COMMENT.

¶13. (U) Minimize considered.  
NIGRO